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1  Introduction   
 
In dialogues ranging from the Symposium to the Timaeus, Plato appears to propose that the 
philosopher’s grasp of the forms may confer immortality upon him.  Whatever can Plato mean in 
making such a claim?  What does he take immortality to consist in, such that it could constitute a 
reward for philosophical enlightenment?  And what, exactly, is the process by which the 
philosopher’s grasp of the forms renders his soul immortal?  Finally, how is this proposal 
compatible with Plato’s repeated assertions, throughout his corpus, that all soul, not just 
philosophical soul, is immortal?   
In response to this final question, O’Brien (1984: 200-1) and Sedley (2009) have suggested 
that Plato distinguishes different forms of immortality.  From Homer onwards, the Greeks appear 
to have seen no difficulty in proposing both that all human soul persists after the death of the body 
and that select individuals can achieve immortality, either as a reward for exceptional achievement 
or as the result of mystical initiation (Burkert 1985: 300, O’Brien 200-1).  O’Brien and Sedley 
propose that, following in this tradition, Plato distinguishes several forms of immortality. On the 
one hand, Plato maintains in the Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus and Laws that all soul is 
immortal in the sense of being imperishable.  On the other hand, in dialogues such as the 
Symposium and Timaeus, Plato also suggests that certain individuals can attain an enhanced form 
of immortality, one that goes beyond the continued existence that all soul is assured of.1  In what 
 
1 Symposium 208b, 208e-9e, 212a; Timaeus 90a-d.  Note that in the Symposium, Plato does not appear to 
claim that all soul is guaranteed immortality; I discuss this complication further in what follows. 
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follows, modifying Sedley’s terminology, I refer to these as general and earned forms of 
immortality.2  O’Brien associates earned immortality with a condition of never-ending blessedness 
that approximates the state of the gods (201); Sedley claims that earned immortality pertains to the 
individual human being, a soul-body composite, rather than his soul alone, and consists in his 
production of intellectual progeny or in his identification with reason (158-60).  While both 
accounts are illuminating, they draw insufficient attention to the way in which the philosopher’s 
earned immortality derives from the immortality of the forms that he contemplates.3  In this 
chapter, my aim is to offer a sustained discussion of the way in which philosophical contemplation 
of forms gives rise to earned immortality in two dialogues, the Phaedo and the Symposium.4  
 I shall approach this topic by applying the distinction between general and earned 
immortality to two related problems in the Phaedo and Symposium: as I shall demonstrate, the 
solution to the problem that I develop for the Phaedo offers the key to addressing a parallel 
difficulty that I uncover in the Symposium.  In the Phaedo, a tension arises when we consider the 
relation of the Affinity Argument (78b-84b) to the other arguments for immortality in the dialogue.  
Whereas the other arguments treat immortality as an essential feature of all soul, the Affinity 
Argument appears to portray immortality as an achievement of only the philosopher’s soul.  How 
 
2 For the sake of convenience, I use the expression general immortality to combine Sedley’s categories of 
essential and conferred immortality.  By general immortality, I mean any form of immortality that applies 
to all human souls. 
3 But see Sedley 2009: 158 and 2017: 98-106. 
4 For a sustained and insightful discussion of immortality in the Phaedo, see Rowett’s chapter in this 
volume.  Rowett and I are in agreement in locating a form of immortality in the Phaedo that goes beyond 
mere extension in time.  However, whereas Rowett identifies this form of immortality with timelessness, I 
identify it with changelessness; on my view, the soul is incapable of the atemporal mode of being of 
forms.  Furthermore, whereas Rowett takes timeless immortality to be an essential feature of all souls, 
albeit one they must aspire fully to realize by divesting themselves of their corporeal existence, I take 
immortality as changelessness to be a state that is only attained by philosophical souls, through their 
assimilation to forms. 
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are these arguments compatible?5  In the Symposium, the problem arises of why Plato should 
appear to deny the immortality of the soul in the flux passage (207c-8b), given his confidence 
concerning the immortality of the soul in dialogues assumed to pre- and post-date the Symposium.6  
Distinguishing between general and earned immortality addresses both problems in ways that are 
mutually illuminating.  I shall argue that, while the Phaedo attributes general immortality to all 
soul, at the same time, in the Affinity Argument, it proposes that the philosopher’s soul can achieve 
earned immortality as a result of its contemplation of forms.  It is this exact form of immortality 
that Plato proposes is unavailable to human soul in the flux passage of the Symposium.  At the 
same time, in the ascent passage (209e-12a), he holds out the possibility – albeit with significant 
reservations – that the philosopher’s soul may transcend its humanity and achieve earned 
immortality as a result of its communion with the form.   
I conclude by arguing that the central puzzle concerning immortality in the Symposium is 
not – as most critics have maintained7 – why Plato should appear to deny immortality of the soul 
in the flux passage: the flux passage is concerned with earned, not general, immortality, and thus 
 
5 Neither Sedley (2009) nor O’Brien (1984) applies the distinction between general and earned 
immortality to this problem in the Phaedo.  Both authors do address the problem that I go on to describe 
in the Symposium, but along significantly different lines than myself.  Both dissolve the appearance of 
inconsistency between the flux passage and Plato’s other arguments for the immortality of the soul by 
arguing that the flux passage does not claim that the soul is mortal, but, rather, that its psychological 
states are in flux (O’Brien 192-5) or that the soul-body composite is mortal (Sedley 159-60).  By contrast, 
I take the passage at face value, as denying that the soul is immortal; I resolve the potential inconsistency 
by maintaining that the form of immortality that it denies to human soul is earned, not general 
immortality.    
6 For the purposes of this chapter, I take the Phaedo to pre-date the Symposium, and the Phaedrus, 
Republic, Timaeus and Laws to post-date it.  For a defense of this assumption, see, e.g., Brandwood 1992, 
Kraut 1992 and, especially, Dover 1965. 
7 Contemporary discussion of this problem was initiated by Hackforth 1950 (though see earlier, Bury 
1932: xliii-v); influential responses include Bluck 1955: 27-9, Crombie 1962: 361-3, Dover 1965, Guthrie 
1975: 387-92, Luce 1952 and Robinson 1995: 125-7 (1st edition 1970).  More recent discussions include 
Ademollo 2018: 52-5, Jorgenson 2018: 65-76, Morgan 1990: 90-3, Nightingale 2017, O’Brien 1984, 
Price 2004: 30-5, Rowe 1998: 185, Sedley 2009: 158-61, Sheffield 2006: 147-8, n. 47 and Woolf 2018: 
98. 
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does not stand in opposition to Plato’s arguments for general immortality in other dialogues.  
Rather, the central puzzle is why he should express reservations concerning the philosopher’s 
prospects of attaining earned immortality, given his optimism on this count in other dialogues.  
Exploring this puzzle reveals an important progression in Plato’s thought.  Whereas the Phaedo is 
confident concerning the philosopher’s prospects of attaining earned immortality, in the 
Symposium, Plato develops deep reservations on this issue; these doubts are addressed in later 
dialogues, when Plato modifies his account of earned immortality. 
2  An Apparent Inconsistency in the Phaedo  
Let us turn to a closer examination of the problem that I outlined for the Phaedo.  In the Phaedo, 
Plato develops a number of arguments for the immortality of the soul.  With the possible exception 
of the Affinity Argument, each attempts to demonstrate that all soul is immortal.  Its immortality 
consists in its not perishing, its enduring.  The Affinity Argument, however, stands in a difficult 
relation to the surrounding arguments for immortality.  The argument begins with the explicit aim 
of proving to Simmias and Cebes that they need not fear that the soul will dissipate upon death 
(77d-e, 78b).  On the face of it, then, the Affinity Argument is a further attempt to demonstrate 
that all soul is imperishable.  However, as the argument progresses, it appears to establish a quite 
different conclusion, that only the philosopher’s soul is immortal and, indeed, that most souls, 
failing to be philosophical, fail to be immortal.8 
 The argument begins by claiming that whatever is unchanging is most likely to be 
incomposite, and that what is incomposite is most likely to be insoluble (78c).  Socrates’ 
 
8 To the extent that the theory of recollection assumes that all souls have a prenatal grasp of the forms, 
then they must all, in some sense, possess the kinship to the forms that is articulated in the Affinity 
Argument.  However, in the souls of the many, this kinship is an unactualized potential, one that is 
inhibited by their attachment to their bodies; this attachment, in turn, causes them to assimilate to the 
corporeal and mortal, rather than to the incorporeal and immortal. 
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argumentative goal is to place the soul in the class of the unchanging, incomposite and hence 
insoluble.  His argument proceeds in three stages.  First, he observes that the forms are unchanging 
and imperceptible, whereas their instantiations are changing and perceptible; since the body is 
perceptible and the soul imperceptible, the body must belong to the class of the changing and hence 
perishable, the soul to the class of the unchanging and hence imperishable (78c-9b).9  So far, so 
good.  It is in the second stage of the Affinity Argument that our problems begin.  Socrates states:  
Whenever, on the one hand (μέν), the soul uses the body to investigate something, whether 
through seeing or hearing or through some other sense – for this is what it is to investigate 
through the body, to investigate something through the senses – then it is dragged by the body 
to the things that are never the same, and it wanders and is stirred and is dizzy, as if drunk, 
because it is in contact with such things...On the other hand (δέ), whenever it investigates itself 
by itself, it departs towards there, to the pure and always existing and immortal and always the 
same, and because it is akin to it, it always comes to be with it whenever it comes to be itself 
by itself and it is able to do so, and it ceases from its wandering and, in relation to these things, 
it is always the same and stable, because it is in contact with such things.  And this state of it 
is called wisdom. (79c-d)10 
 
Cebes concludes on this basis that the soul ‘is completely and in every way more like what is 
always the same than that which is not’ (79e).  But, on the face of it, it is difficult to see how this 
conclusion follows.  According to Socrates’ argument, the soul is capable of being both changeful 
and changeless, depending on whether it devotes itself to sense-perception or to contemplation.  
The only way to make sense of the argument is to assume that the condition of the soul when it 
contemplates forms is somehow more revealing of its nature than its condition when it devotes 
itself to sense-perception.  This assumption can, perhaps, be supported by Plato’s use of the men 
... de (on the one hand...on the other hand) construction at 79c2 and d1: he thereby develops a 
 
9 One puzzling feature of this argument is that it concludes that the soul is more akin to the class to which 
the forms belong than to the class to which their instantiations belong (78d-79a, 80a-b).  But one might 
have thought that a virtuous soul belongs to the class of τὰ πολλὰ καλά, the many beautiful things 
(79d10). 
10 Translations are my own, though at points I borrow the phrasings of Nehamas and Woodruff 1989, 
Rowe 1998, and Sedley and Long 2011.  
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contrast between the condition of the soul when it tries to examine something by means of the body 
and its condition when it investigates itself by itself.  Perhaps the implication is that the soul’s true 
nature can only be discerned when it acts on its own, but is obscured when it is contaminated by 
the addition of an extraneous and opposed element, the body.11  Alternately, we might follow 
Woolf (2004: 112) and Lorenz (2009) in taking the argument to imply that the soul is, in its truest 
nature, unchanging because that is its condition when it is performing its proper function and 
achieving its corresponding virtue, wisdom.  Yet on either interpretation, the following difficulty 
arises.  Even as the argument suggests that in its best and purest condition, the soul is unchanging, 
it relies on a contrast that implies that the soul is equally capable of being changeful and hence of 
belonging to the class of the perishable.  A similar difficulty confronts us when we turn to the third, 
final stage of the Affinity Argument (79e-80a).  Here, Socrates argues that since the soul rules 
over the body, it is akin to the divine, and belongs to the class of the immortal; conversely, the 
body, insofar as it is ruled, belongs to the class of the mortal.  This suggests that souls which fail 
to rule over the body – in other words, the souls of all those non-philosophers whose lives are ruled 
by their bodily needs and desires – fail to belong to the class of the divine and hence immortal.12 
 Things only become more problematic in the discussion that follows.  In what amounts to 
a protreptic to philosophy, Socrates maintains that the prize for contemplation is the purification 
of one’s soul, the penalty for a life of bodily pleasure, its corruption.  Souls that that fail to separate 
themselves from the body, to the extent possible during life, depart with a corporeal accretion that 
renders them visible and heavy and condemns them to wander the earth, eventually entering 
another body (81b-e).  Thus, even as Socrates portrays non-philosophical souls as persisting after 
 
11 Note the parallel to the Glaucus passage at Republic 611b-c. 
12 Tellingly, at 66d, in describing the ways in which the body presents an obstacle to contemplation, Plato 
describes the would-be philosophers as enslaved (δουλεύοντες) to the service of the body. 
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death, he assigns to them the very corporeal attributes that guarantee their membership in the class 
of the visible, changeable and perishable.  Strikingly, such souls are even described as becoming 
corporeal (σωματοειδές, 83d5).  The argument concludes by hearkening back to Simmias’ and 
Cebes’ request that Socrates demonstrate to them that the soul cannot be scattered, but it now 
makes explicit that his proof depends on the sort of nurture a soul has received: ‘From that sort of 
nurture, there is no danger that it should fear...that on separating from the body it should be torn 
apart, blown away by the winds and go flying off, and no longer be anything anywhere’ (84b).13  
The Affinity Argument, it turns out, delivers something quite different than was promised: far 
from showing that all soul is immortal, it implies that most souls are intimately connected to the 
corporeal realm, and that only philosophical souls properly belong to the class of the immortal. 
3  Two Senses of Immortality in the Phaedo 
How, then, are we to address this seeming inconsistency in Plato’s position?  I propose that it can 
be resolved if we distinguish two forms of mortality and immortality.  On the one hand, all soul in 
the Phaedo is immortal in the sense of being imperishable.  On the other hand, in the Affinity 
Argument, Plato proposes that the philosopher’s soul can achieve earned immortality through its 
contemplation of forms.  The Affinity Argument’s further implication, that the souls of non-
philosophers are mortal, is not in conflict with the rest of the dialogue because two quite different 
senses of immortality are at work, general and earned immortality.  But what evidence do we have 
that these two senses of immortality are at work?  And how does Plato conceive of earned 
immortality in the Phaedo? 
 
13 Woolf provides an excellent discussion of the tensions between the Affinity Argument and the rest of 
the dialogue, though he resolves them along different lines than myself, proposing that Plato is inviting 
the reader to enter into conversation with the dialogue by comparing and contrasting the arguments (2004: 
111-12, n. 19). 
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 We can begin to make the case that there are two senses of immortality at work in the 
Phaedo by contrasting the condition of the soul of the non-philosopher, who is caught in the cycle 
of rebirth, with that of the philosopher, who escapes it.  Both souls are immortal, but their 
immortality takes on quite different forms. The soul of the philosopher, which avoids the body 
during life and departs pure, makes its way to Hades, ‘to the invisible, which is like itself, the 
divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there, it can be happy...and, as is said of the initiates, 
truly spend the rest of time with the gods’ (81a).  By contrast, the soul of the non-philosopher, that 
is ‘interspersed with the corporeal, with which it has grown together, on account of its communion 
and intercourse with the body,’ is ‘never able to arrive purely to Hades, but always exits full of 
body, so that it falls right away back into another body and grows in it as if sown there, and on 
account of this, it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and one-in-form’ (81c, 
83d-e).  Deploying language that is deliberately evocative of religious initiation and apotheosis, 
Plato suggests that upon death, the soul of the philosopher is able to approach the condition of the 
gods, to achieve a state of blessed and eternal contemplation.14  By contrast, souls that depart 
impure retain a corporeal accretion and an attraction to and identification with the sensible world 
that condemns them to a cycle of death and reincarnation.  On the one hand, these passages make 
clear that the soul of the non-philosopher is immortal in the sense that it continues to exist after 
the death of the body.  Indeed, it almost immediately adopts another body and with it another 
corporeal life.  At the same time, such a soul’s intimate connection with the sensible world 
precludes it from the form of immortality that the soul of the philosopher achieves.  
 Thus far, we have observed that, whereas the soul of the non-philosopher and the soul of 
the philosopher both persist after the death of the body, their post mortem fates are quite different: 
 
14 Note that at 81a as well as 82b-c, Plato hints at an affinity principle that he made fully explicit at 67a-b, 
that in order to consort with the gods, we must approximate their purity.   
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the former is caught in a cycle of reincarnation, whereas the latter achieves an incorporeal, godlike 
condition.  But are we correct to conclude that two senses of immortality are at work?  Our 
hypothesis receives confirmation from the fact that Plato offers two quite different treatments of 
death and, correspondingly, of deathlessness (ἀθανασία).15  In Socrates’ defense, he explicitly 
defines death as the separation of the soul from the body: ‘Is [death] anything other than the 
separation of the soul from the body?’ (64c, cf. 67d).  In this regard, he describes the soul of the 
philosopher as experiencing and even welcoming death as an escape from human evils (84a-b).16  
By contrast, in the final argument, Plato argues that insofar as the soul is a principle of life, it 
cannot undergo death.  Its separating from the body is presented as an alternative to its dying.  In 
this context, Plato treats death not as the separation of the soul from the body, but rather as its 
destruction (105c-7a).  According to the Affinity Argument, the souls of non-philosophers are 
doomed to a cycle of reincarnation.  Thus, in our first sense, they undergo death – that is, separation 
from the body – repeatedly and are mortal; in our second sense, however, they are deathless and 
hence immortal.17  
 
15 See Rowett’s chapter in this volume for further discussion of different senses of death and 
deathlessness in the Phaedo.  Like myself, Rowett observes that there is a shift in the sense of death in the 
final argument, but she takes it to mean the absence of consciousness and life, whereas I take it to mean 
destruction. 
16 Note that the subject of the entire passage at 84a-b is the philosopher’s soul (ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου); 
there is no shift in subject when Plato describes the soul as living and dying at 84b1-2.  Similarly, at 77d, 
Plato claims that it is necessary for the soul to continue to exist when it dies (ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι), and 
at 80e-1a, he refers to the soul as practicing dying easily.  When Cebes develops his weaver objection in 
response to Socrates, he appears to understand Socrates’ discussion of metempsychosis as implying that 
the soul is born and dies many times (88a); his worry is that in one of these deaths, the soul may perish.  It 
is perhaps in response to Cebes’ distinction between dying and perishing that Plato introduces a new 
definition of death at 91d: ‘this is death, the destruction of the soul.’ 
17 In this context, it is interesting to observe that, while at 80d, Plato equates Hades with the invisible 
realm of forms to which the philosopher’s soul makes its way upon death, in the final argument, he claims 
that ‘the soul is immortal and indestructible and our souls will truly exist in Hades’ (106e-7a), apparently 
treating Hades as the realm that all souls occupy after death. 
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I have made the case that there are two forms of immortality at work in the Phaedo: 
whereas all souls are immortal in the sense of being indestructible, the philosopher’s soul can 
achieve a further, earned form of immortality.  How does Plato conceive of it?  We can answer 
this question by taking a closer look at the mechanism by which the philosopher achieves earned 
immortality.  According to the Affinity Argument, the philosopher achieves immortality as a result 
of his contemplation of forms.  In particular, should he succeed in maximally dissociating his soul 
from his body, his soul will become akin to the forms and hence able to grasp them (67a-b, 79c-
d).  As a result of his contemplation, the soul of the philosopher not only enters into the realm of 
the forms, but, further, it appears to assimilate to them.  In particular, Plato emphasizes that his 
soul assimilates to their changelessness: ‘it ceases from its wandering and, in relation to these 
things, it is always the same and stable, because it is in contact with such things’ (79d).  Why does 
Plato emphasize that the soul assimilates to the changelessness of the forms?  Here, it will be 
helpful to look forward to the Timaeus.  In the Timaeus, Plato develops a contrast between the 
eternality of the forms, which exist outside of time, with the immortality of generated beings, 
which exist within time (37d-8c).  Crucially, Plato emphasizes that the forms are eternal in virtue 
of the fact that they are unchanging, whereas generated beings, as subject to change, are only 
capable of a second-rate form of immortality, persistence in time.  My proposal, then, is that the 
philosopher’s earned immortality consists not merely in his soul’s persistence in time, but in the 
changelessness it acquires as a result of its assimilation to the forms he contemplates; in what 
follows, I refer to this condition as changeless eternality.  It is starkly opposed to the condition of 
the soul that is condemned to the cycle of life, death and rebirth, a soul that is quasi-corporeal and 
subject to endless change.18  
 
18 Compare Sami Yli-Karjanmaa’s discussion in this volume of reincarnation and immortality in Philo. 
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4  An Apparent Inconsistency in the Symposium 
With this understanding of the role of earned immortality in the Phaedo in place, we can now turn 
to our puzzle in the Symposium.  In a volte-face that has long taxed interpreters, in the flux passage 
of the Symposium, Plato appears to temporarily abandon his commitment to the immortality of the 
soul.  In this passage, Diotima provides a general characterization of mortal nature as subject to 
constant flux, and hence as incapable of true immortality and condemned to a second-best 
approximation to it, namely reproduction.  As I devote considerable attention to this passage, I will 
begin by quoting it in its entirety: 
Well, she said, if you agree that by its nature, love is of what we have often agreed it is of, 
then do not wonder.  For the same account applies to animals as to humans: mortal nature 
seeks as far as possible to always exist and to be immortal.  But it is only able in this 
manner, through generation, because it always leaves behind another new thing in 
exchange for the old.  For even in the time in which each living being is said to live and to 
be the same – like how a person is called the same from childhood until he becomes an old 
man – he is called the same while never being made up of the same things, but while always 
being both renewed and destroyed19 in his hair, his flesh, his bones, his blood and his whole 
body.  And this is not just the case with the body, but also with the soul: its manners, 
customs, beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, none of these is ever the same in anyone, 
but some are coming into existence and others are being destroyed. It’s even stranger than 
this with knowledge: not only do some pieces of knowledge come to exist in us while 
others are destroyed, so that we are never the same even in terms of our knowledge, but 
every single piece of knowledge undergoes the same process.  For what we call ‘going over 
things’ exists because knowledge is leaving us.  For forgetting is the departure of 
knowledge, while going over something creates in us a new memory to replace the one that 
is departing, thereby preserving the piece of knowledge, so that it appears to be the same.  
In this way all that is mortal is preserved, not by being always completely the same like the 
divine, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind in us another new thing that 
is like it was.  It is in this manner, Socrates, she said, that the mortal partakes of immortality, 
both in body and in everything else, but the immortal does so in another way.  So don’t 
wonder if everything by nature honors its offspring, for this eagerness, this love, which 




19 The Greek participle (ἀπολλύς) is active and so the more literal meaning is that the body is always 
‘losing’ parts of itself.  
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Several things are troubling about this passage.  In the first place, the passage draws a sharp 
distinction between mortal nature and the divine.  Mortal nature is able to persist only by 
replenishing itself during this life and, after death, through a parallel process of replacing itself 
with its offspring.  However, the strong implication is that this is not a genuine form of 
immortality—the concluding contrast between how the mortal and the immortal partake of 
immortality is surely loaded.  The immortal partakes of immortality by remaining forever the same; 
the passage appears to identify this with genuine immortality and to claim that humans are 
incapable of this form of immortality.  In a similar vein, at 206c, Plato refers to reproduction as an 
immortal thing for a mortal creature (ἐν θνητῷ); at 206e, he describes reproduction as something 
immortal as far as can be the case for something mortal (ὡς θνητῷ); and at 207d, he describes 
mortal nature as seeking as far as possible (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) to be immortal.  Plato could not be 
more explicit in maintaining that, though humans may aspire to immortality, they remain resolutely 
mortal. 
In the second place, the passage advances this conclusion by drawing a troubling parallel 
between the body and the soul.  Just as the body is never composed of the same material parts, but 
must constantly replenish itself, so the soul is never composed of the same psychic elements, but 
must constantly regenerate itself.  Contrast this with the opposition Plato develops between body 
and soul in the Phaedo, where the soul is placed in the class of the changeless, the body in the 
class of the changeable (80a-b).  The implication of the flux passage is that the soul, like the body, 
is incapable of true immortality, which requires that it always remain the same; to the extent that 
it is capable of immortality, it is only capable of a second-rate sort, through constantly regenerating 
itself.    
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Numerous interpreters have resisted this conclusion.  Thus, Dover, for example, maintains 
that the passage only claims that psychic states are subject to flux, and that it allows for the 
possibility that the soul itself, as the subject of psychic states, is unchanging and immortal.20  
However, such a maneuver is rendered implausible by the studious parallel the passage develops 
between body and soul.21  Plato first claims that each human ‘is called the same while never being 
made up of the same things, but while always being both renewed and destroyed in his hair, his 
flesh, his bones, his blood and his whole body.’  The body clearly is not on all fours with the other 
items in this list: it is not as though the human is renewed and destroyed in his hair and flesh and, 
in addition to these, in his body.  Rather, ‘and’ (καί) here has a summative force: the items 
preceding the body in this list are constituents of the body.  In virtue of the fact that they are subject 
to destruction and renewal, the body as a whole is subject to flux.  Plato continues: ‘And this is not 
just the case with the body, but also with the soul (καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν 
ψυχήν): its manners, customs, beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, none of these is ever the 
same in anyone, but some are coming into existence and others are being destroyed.’  Plato’s use 
of the phrase καὶ μὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν is significant.  It indicates that 
whatever he has just established in the case of the body also applies in the case of the soul.  What 
he has just established about the body is that it is never strictly the same due to the flux of its 
constituents.  It follows that what Plato is claiming about the soul is that it is never strictly the 
same due to the flux of its manners, customs, beliefs etc.  The reason the flux of the human’s hair, 
flesh and bones entails that his body is never the same is that his body is made up of these elements; 
 
20 Dover 1987: 149; see also Dover 1965: 19-20, Ademollo 2018: 54-5, O’Brien 1984: 195, and Price 
2004: 30.  Morgan 1990: 92-3, Robinson 1995: 126-7, Rowe 1998: 185 and Sedley 2009: 159-60, 
following Luce 1952, make a related argument, that Plato is only denying that human nature, i.e. the soul-
body composite, is immortal, and does not deny the immortality of the soul itself. 
21 See Sheffield 2006: 147-8, n. 47. 
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by analogy, the reason the human’s soul is never the same is that it is composed of mental states 
that are subject to flux. 
 Our passage concludes: ‘In this way all that is mortal is preserved, not by being always 
completely the same like the divine, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind in us 
another new thing that is like it was.  It is in this manner, Socrates, she said, that the mortal partakes 
of immortality, both in body and in everything else, but the immortal does so in another way.’  
Interpreters such as Dover insist that in the final sentence, Plato does not place the soul in the class 
of the mortal; instead it belongs to that of the immortal.  But note the parallels between the final 
sentence and its predecessor: whatever belongs to the class of the immortal in the final sentence 
belongs to the class of the divine in that which precedes it.  Thus, on my opponents’ line of 
interpretation, the souls of humans and other animals would not just be immortal, but also divine.  
But that would be extremely jarring in a dialogue in which Plato has been at pains to emphasize 
the chasm that separates the human from the divine (e.g. 202e-203a).  Furthermore, the phrase 
‘everything else’ in the concluding sentence clearly refers to the mental states that Plato has just 
characterized as subject to flux.  But how can the soul belong to the class of the divine and 
unchanging if its mental states are mortal and subject to flux?22 
 Finally, on the alternative interpretation, Plato’s argumentative structure, both within this 
passage and, more broadly, throughout Diotima’s speech, begins to fall apart.  On my reading, the 
argumentative structure of this passage is as follows.  Plato claims that living beings can only 
achieve immortality through reproduction.  He supports this by an analogy to the way in which 
they count as persisting within a given life: just as the organism only persists within a given life 
 
22 Thus, the tension I am exploring still obtains, even on those interpretations that deny that the soul is 
composed of its mental states: even if the soul is a persisting and distinct subject of mental states, the mere 
fact that its mental states undergo constant flux suffices to demonstrate that the soul does not remain ‘always 
completely the same’ (208a8), and hence is not immortal. 
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through regeneration, so it only persists across lives by reproduction.  He supports the first part of 
this analogy by arguing that the organism, the soul-body composite, maintains its existence within 
a given life through regenerating both its somatic and its psychic constituents.  If mental states 
were not psychic constituents, and if the soul were, instead, some unchanging subject of these 
mental states, then it is utterly unclear what Plato would be accomplishing by including the claim 
that mental states are subject to flux, and, indeed, by presenting it as a parallel claim to that 
concerning the body’s constituents.  In what follows, Plato argues that we are capable of 
immortality through two sorts of pregnancy and reproduction: somatic and psychic.  If the soul is 
not composed of its mental states and hence is not subject to flux, but is rather an unchanging 
subject of mental states, then why ever would humans pursue psychic reproduction?  They would 
already be guaranteed immortality via the persistence of their changeless souls.23  
In sum: the flux passage implies that, just as the perishing of flesh and blood renders our 
bodies mortal, so the perishing of thoughts and desires renders our souls mortal.  But this proposal, 
that the soul is mortal, stands in obvious conflict with Plato’s arguments for the immortality of all 
soul in dialogues ranging from the Phaedo through the Phaedrus.  How, then, are we to rescue 
Plato from the appearance of gross inconsistency? 
5  Immortality as Changelessness in the Symposium 
 
23 One ground for rejecting the interpretation that I have outlined is that the proposal that the soul is 
composed of its mental states might seem to be at odds with the status of the soul as the persisting subject 
of its mental states—see, e.g., Ademollo 2018: 52-5, Dover 1965: 19 and Price 2004: 24-5.  However, this 
need not follow: as Quinton notes, on a bundle theory of the mind, the subject might, quite minimally, be 
the interrelated set of mental states (2008: 55-7).  Thus, this objection would only have force if we had 
decisive evidence that Plato subscribes to a Berkeleyan view on which whatever is the subject of mental 
states cannot itself be a set of mental states.  However, there is no direct evidence that he is committed to 
this thesis; indeed, the fact that he uses phrases such as nous and dianoia to refer both to the capacity for 
thought and to thought itself suggests that he draws no such sharp distinction. 
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In what follows, I will argue that the traditional problem concerning immortality in the Symposium 
is, simply put, misplaced.  To see why this is so, we should consider more carefully what form of 
immortality Plato is denying to human soul in the flux passage.  The argumentative structure of 
the passage is, on the face of it, puzzling.  Plato begins by stating that mortal nature is only capable 
of immortality through reproduction ‘because it always leaves behind another new thing in 
exchange for the old’ (207d).  He then provides a lengthy explanation for why this should be so: 
it is because ‘even in the time in which each living being is said to live and to be the same...he is 
called the same while never being made up of the same things, but while always being both 
renewed and destroyed’ (207d); Plato goes on to explain, in detail, how this continuous destruction 
and regeneration applies to both our somatic and psychic constituents.  But why should the fact 
that, during a given life, we can only maintain our continued existence by regenerating ourselves 
entail that the only sort of immortality we are capable of involves replacing ourselves after death 
through our offspring?  Why might our souls not, instead, persist after the death of the body by 
continuing to replenish their psychological states?  The force of Plato’s reasoning becomes 
apparent if we turn to the conclusion of his argument: ‘In this way all that is mortal is preserved, 
not by being always completely the same like the divine, but because what is departing and aging 
leaves behind in us another new thing that is like it was.24  It is in this manner ... that the mortal 
partakes of immortality, both in body and in everything else, but the immortal does so in another 
way’ (208a-b).  The reason that Plato draws attention to the flux that characterizes mortal beings 
 
24 I understand Plato to be claiming in this passage that the gods are immortal in virtue of being 
qualitatively unchanged across time.  That παντάπασιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι (‘being always completely the 
same’) is referring to the gods’ qualitative identity, and not merely their numerical identity, is indicated 
by Plato’s use of the intensifier, παντάπασιν: whereas numerical identity does not admit of degree, 
qualitative identity does.  Furthermore, the context implies a contrast between how gods and how humans 
achieve immortality, where the human mode involves constant change; the implication is that the divine 
mode does not. 
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such as ourselves is that it entails that we are incapable of a very specific form of immortality, 
‘being always absolutely the same.’  Given that we are subject to flux in both body and soul, and 
must rely on replenishment to maintain our continued existence, there is no hope that upon death 
we should be able to achieve what I have referred to as changeless eternality.   
 But, as we have seen, changeless eternality is not the only way that Plato thinks of 
immortality; thus, to deny that the soul is capable of changeless eternality is not tantamount to 
denying that it is capable of general immortality, i.e. persistence in time.  In fact, there are several 
ways in which a soul might realize general immortality.  On the one hand, it might persist through 
time in virtue of being caught in an endless cycle of change—of regeneration and reproduction, as 
Plato outlines in the Symposium, or of birth, death and rebirth, as he suggests in the Phaedo.  On 
the other hand, it might persist in virtue of remaining the same forever.  This is the form of 
immortality that we encountered in the Affinity Argument, the earned immortality in which the 
philosopher’s soul assimilates to the forms.  It is this form of immortality, not general immortality, 
that Plato is concerned to deny to human soul in the flux passage.25 
 
25 Of course, if the flux passage does not contradict Plato’s arguments for general immortality in other 
dialogues, then we might wonder why Plato should emphasize in the Symposium that mortal nature seeks 
to achieve immortality through reproduction.  If we are already guaranteed persistence in time, then why 
bother?  I can see at least two ways of addressing this concern.  First, in describing the mortal pursuit of 
immortality, Plato is attempting to give an explanation of the behavior of hoi polloi; it need not follow 
that he considers their behavior to be rationally justifiable (see my 2010).  Perhaps the best explanation 
we can offer of the human drive to reproduce in body or in soul is that for many this seems like the closest 
they can come to cheating death.  Second, Plato maintains that the reason we wish for immortality is to 
secure eternal possession of the good.  But it is not clear that the form of immortality that he argues for in 
other dialogues is sufficiently psychologically robust to satisfy this desire.  If my soul persists after my 
death as a sort of imperishable psychic stuff, and then assumes a new life in a new body with little or no 
recollection of my previous existence, then it is not at all clear that this should reassure me, as the person I 
am now, that I will continue to possess the good after death (see Rowe 1996: 9-10).  In that case, 
reproductive immortality might seem to offer a better, or at least complementary, path towards achieving 
eternal possession of the good. 
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 Why the focus on changeless eternality?  The reason for this is that the topic of the dialogue 
is eros, construed as the pursuit of happiness, eudaimonia.26  Eudaimonia, in turn, is defined as 
eternal possession of the good (202c, 204e, 205a, 206a, 207a).  Commentators have long worried 
that Plato performs a philosophical legerdemain in moving from the claim at 205a, that humans 
always want to possess the good, to the claim at 206a that humans want to possess the good 
always—i.e. to possess the good into eternity.27  This progression is less troubling if we attend to 
the dialogue’s emphasis on the role of eros in bringing humankind into relation to the divine.  Thus, 
Socrates’ exchange with Diotima begins by establishing that, while Eros is not a god, he is a spirit, 
whose function is to bind together the mortal and the divine (202d-3a).  If we think of gods as 
beings in the best possible condition, then it should seem a natural continuation of Plato’s 
eudaimonism that our telos (end) should be, as Plato’s followers maintained, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ 
τὸ δυνατόν (assimilation to god to the degree possible).28  But part and parcel of the gods’ 
blessedness is that they do not just possess what is beautiful and good (202c), but that they possess 
it forever and unchangingly.  On this account, it is not sufficient for happiness that one should 
possess the good or that one should exist forever; what is required is that one possess the good 
forever—in other words, what is required is changeless eternality in possession of the good.29  It 
is for this reason that, in the Republic, Plato is scandalized by depictions of the gods as subject to 
 
26 Sheffield 2012 has an excellent discussion of this point. 
27 See Dover 1987: 144, Price 2004: 17, Sheffield 2006: 81-2. 
28 See Annas’ 1999 and Sedley’s 1999 seminal discussions. 
29 One might object that the gods only need changelessness in one respect, in their possession of the good; 
change in other respects would not compromise their happiness.  However, in the Republic passage that I 
go on to discuss, Plato seems to suggest that were the gods to change at all, they would enter into a worse 
condition (380c-1e).  This implies that Plato assumes that there is only one best condition for the gods to 
be in, and that to undergo any change whatsoever would compromise their blessedness.  It is worth noting 
that, while in later dialogues, such as the Timaeus and Laws, Plato depicts the cosmic gods as subject to 
change, he presents them as subject to maximally stable forms of change, rotation and revolution, because 
he continues to associate changelessness with perfection (Timaeus 40a-b, Laws 898a-b). 
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change (380c-1e).  As beings that are perfect, and hence in the best possible condition, were they 
to change, they would voluntarily enter into a worse condition, a psychological impossibility.  
Thus, the reason that Plato specifies in the flux passage that gods enjoy changeless eternality is 
because this is the only form of immortality that will ensure them eternal possession of the good.   
 In sum, given the eudaimonist focus of the Symposium, it is only changeless eternality that 
is relevant to Plato’s argumentative purposes.  The form of immortality that Plato assigns to all 
soul in other dialogues – persistence in time – is simply beside the point.  A soul that is subject to 
an endless cycle of birth, death, punishment and rebirth is simply not the sort of thing to attain the 
form of immortality – changeless eternality – that enables man to approximate the condition of the 
gods and achieve permanent possession of the good.   
6  Earned Immortality in the Symposium 
While our discussion may have removed the appearance of conflict between the flux passage and 
Plato’s arguments for general immortality in other dialogues, it gives rise to a different, and I 
believe more interesting problem for Plato: to what degree is he confident, in the Symposium, that 
the philosopher can attain earned immortality, that is, changeless eternality?  To answer this, we 
must first address the question of how, exactly, earned immortality is supposed to be achieved in 
the Symposium. At the conclusion of the ascent, Plato writes: ‘Or don’t you realize that only there, 
seeing the beautiful with that by which he ought to see it, will it be possible for him to give birth, 
not to images of virtue, because he is not in touch with images, but to true virtue, because he is in 
touch with the truth.  And giving birth to true virtue, and nourishing it, it will belong to him to 
become god-loved and, if indeed to anyone, to become immortal’ (212a).  In this passage, Plato 
describes a very specific sequence of events: the philosopher grasps the form of beauty and, as a 
result, is able to give birth to true virtue, become god-loved and, possibly, immortal.  But the 
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passage does not make clear the connection between these events: what is it that causes the 
philosopher to possibly become immortal?  On the face of it, his immortality might appear to be 
related to his giving birth: thus, one popular interpretive proposal is that at the culmination of the 
ascent, the philosopher attains immortality through his moral and intellectual progeny, by 
transmitting his virtue and wisdom to the souls of his students.30  But this suggestion will not do.  
For if the philosopher achieves only reproductive immortality at the culmination of the ascent, then 
his condition will be no improvement over that of the lower lovers; he, too, will fail to secure 
eternal possession of the good for himself – the stated goal of eros – but will achieve only some 
metaphorical cousin of happiness, in which he has some causal connection to others’ attainment 
of happiness.  But in describing the ascent as the ‘final and highest mysteries, for which the [lower 
mysteries] are done’ (210a), Plato sets up an expectation that the philosopher should secure a 
consummation of eros superior to that of the lower lovers.31  Furthermore, as several interpreters 
have noted, there is simply no mention in the text of the philosopher giving birth to virtue in 
someone else.  On the contrary, there is every indication that he is no longer especially concerned 
with the education of young minds: whereas at 210c, the lover is described as seeking to improve 
the soul of his beloved, by 210e, the beloved seems to have completely disappeared.  Indeed, at 
211c, the beloved is described as a step (ἐπαναβασμός) that the lover climbs over to reach the form 
of beauty, and at 211d-e, Plato emphasizes that, having grasped the form of beauty, the initiate no 
 
30 Notably Price 2004: 49-54.  Nightingale 2017 makes a related proposal, that the philosopher’s 
immortality is due to his initiating a chain of discourse.   
31 In the following section, I will argue that Plato has significant reservations about whether even the 
philosophical initiate who comes to grasp the form will attain changeless eternality.  However, even if 
Plato is skeptical on that count, on the interpretation I go on to offer – according to which the 
philosopher’s grasp of the form imparts a certain degree of changelessness to his soul – we can at least 
see why one might hope that this would give his soul changeless immortality.  By contrast, if the 
philosopher is simply creating psychic offspring in others, then the final mysteries would not even 
suggest a path by which he might attain true immortality and bring eros to fruition.  
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longer sees human beauty as truly worthwhile, but rather as ‘mortal nonsense’ (φλυαρία θνητή; cf. 
211a).32 
 But if his purpose is not to imply that the philosopher, like the lower lovers, achieves 
reproductive immortality, then why should Plato portray the philosopher as giving birth to virtue?  
To answer this, we should recall that the goal of eros is not immortality for its own sake, but eternal 
possession of the good.  What sort of good could Plato have in mind in the Symposium when he 
defines happiness as eternal possession of the good?  It takes little prompting to recognize that, for 
Plato, the greatest good is virtue.  Thus, the reason that Plato portrays the philosopher as giving 
birth to virtue in himself is that it is only through becoming good – that is, virtuous – that the 
philosopher can truly come to possess the good.33  One might worry that this misinterprets the goal 
of the philosopher’s eros; after all, the overwhelming focus of the ascent is not so much on the 
philosopher’s development of virtue as on his quest to understand beauty.  But this problem 
disappears if we recognize that the form of virtue Plato has in mind at the culmination of the ascent 
is wisdom.34  To grasp the form simply is to become wise; thus, there is no need to choose between 
the sight of the form and the development of virtue as the telos of the ascent, nor is there any puzzle 
as to why the philosopher’s grasp of the form should cause him to give birth to virtue. 
 But this still leaves us with the question of how the philosopher can achieve not just 
possession of the good, but eternal possession of it.  In other words, how does the philosopher 
become immortal?  We might begin to answer this question by noting that Plato’s description of 
 
32 For further arguments against the claim that the philosophical initiate achieves immortality by proxy, 
see O’Brien (1984: 196-9), Sedley (2009: 160) and Sheffield (2006: 146). 
33 See Sheffield 2006: 120, 134. 
34 This assumption receives strong support from the striking parallels between Symposium 212a and 
Republic 490a-b.  In the Republic passage, the philosopher’s grasp of the forms results in his giving birth 
to intelligence and truth.  Sedley defends the assumption that the virtue in question is purely intellectual 
through a careful comparison of the Symposium to the Timaeus (2017: 104-5); see also Sheffield 2006: 
134. 
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the form of beauty in the ascent strikingly draws attention to its changeless eternality.  He begins 
by observing that the form always is, and does not come into being or cease to exist, wax or wane 
(211a).  He then adds that it is unqualifiedly beautiful: it does not appear ugly at any time, in 
relation to any comparandum, context or perceiver; its beauty is, therefore, immune to change.   
What Plato is emphasizing is that the form possesses exactly the form of immortality that he 
attributes to the gods and denies to mortals in the flux passage.35  This, in turn, suggests that the 
philosopher’s soul, to the extent that it is able to become immortal, owes its immortality to that of 
the forms that he contemplates.  This suggestion, that the philosopher’s immortality is somehow 
indebted to that of the forms, receives confirmation from our discussion of the Phaedo.  In the 
Affinity Argument, the philosopher’s soul is able to achieve changeless eternality precisely 
because the objects that it contemplates, forms, are stable and unchanging (79d).  We see exactly 
the same idea in other dialogues.  In the Republic, Plato writes that ‘the philosopher, having 
communion with what is divine and ordered becomes as ordered and divine as a human can be’ 
(500c-d)—the condition of the philosopher’s soul is a direct product of that of the forms that he 
grasps. Later, in the Glaucus passage, Plato suggests that the soul can only achieve its truest nature, 
and with it an effortless form of immortality, in light of its relation to the forms; Plato’s description 
of the forms as ‘divine, immortal and always existing,’ and of the soul as akin (συγγενής) to them 
suggests that its immortality is parasitic upon theirs (611e).  In the Timaeus, Plato writes that ‘if a 
man has seriously devoted himself to love of learning and true wisdom, and if he has exercised 
these parts of himself most of all, then it is absolutely necessary for him to think immortal and 
divine thoughts, if indeed he is grasping truth, and as far as is permitted for human nature to partake 
of immortality, he will not fall short of this by even a measure’ (90b-c; cf. 47b-c).  In this passage, 
 
35 See also Lear 2006: 114-16. 
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the immortality that the philosopher achieves is a direct product of the immortal nature of his 
thoughts.  Finally, in the Phaedrus, it is the soul’s grasp of the immortal forms that enables it to 
sustain its incorporeal existence, in virtue of which it qualifies as truly immortal, and not as a 
component of a composite, mortal being (246e, 249c).  
 Suppose that the philosopher’s soul owes its immortality to that of the forms that it 
contemplates.  How, exactly, does their immortality ‘rub off’ onto him?  Plato’s position is difficult 
to reconstruct, and my account can only be conjectural.  Clearly Plato has in mind some sort of 
view according to which knowledge involves the assimilation of knower to known.  But can we 
say more than that?  One clue lies in the flux passage.  As we saw, in that passage, Plato develops 
a parallel between body and soul: just as the body is composed of flesh, blood and bones, so the 
soul is composed of its mental states.36  But if the soul is made up of its mental states, then we can 
see how the eternality of the forms might rub off onto the philosopher.  The forms, according to 
Plato, are unchanging and stable; a full cognitive grasp of them, in turn, yields a condition, wisdom, 
that is unchanging and stable, both because its truth value is not contextually variable and because 
it is not liable to be contradicted or abandoned.  If the philosopher’s wisdom is a constituent of his 
soul, then the stability and changelessness of its objects will be imparted directly to his soul.37  If 
we add to this the assumption that the soul is imperishable – defended by Plato in other dialogues 
 
36 Readers who instead take the soul to be the subject of its mental states might accept the following, 
modified version, of the argument that I go on to advance.  If the soul is the subject of its mental states, 
then its being changeful or changeless consists in its mental states changing or remaining stable.  Thus, 
for the soul to be changeless, its mental states must be changeless; in what follows, I propose that this is 
what knowledge of the forms effects. 
37 Of course, to the extent that one’s soul is composed of eternally true knowledge, it may fail to differ 
from the souls of other philosophers (especially if we assume that Plato is a coherentist about knowledge, 
such that it would be impossible to have a full understanding of one form in isolation from understanding 
all the others).  In that case, the form of immortality that Plato envisions here, in which one’s soul is 
composed of a set of eternally true beliefs, might strike some as overly impersonal.  I doubt, however, that 
Plato would find it problematic.  For further discussion see Gerson’s chapter below.  
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– then the conclusion will be that, should the soul come to know the forms, it will achieve 
changeless eternality.38  
7  Skepticism about Earned Immortality in the Symposium 
But this brings us to what I take to be the fundamental puzzle concerning immortality in the 
Symposium.  At the same time as Plato sketches out how the philosopher’s grasp of the form might 
cause his soul to assimilate to its immortal nature, he reveals significant doubts about whether this 
is in fact something that any human can hope to achieve.  These doubts are highlighted at the 
conclusion of the ascent.  Rather than confidently affirm that the philosopher shall become 
immortal, he writes that he shall become immortal εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων, if indeed any human 
can (212a).39  If the philosopher fails to achieve changeless eternality, then he will fail to achieve 
true happiness and fall short of the goal of eros.  Thus, if Plato were confident about the 
philosopher’s prospects of becoming immortal, he would not use this qualified phrasing; his 
purpose appears to be to sketch out what the philosopher hopes to achieve through his grasp of the 
forms, while at the same time raising significant doubts about his odds of achieving it.  We see 
these same doubts developed in the flux passage, when Plato claims that human soul, by its very 
nature, is incapable of stability.  Thus, for the philosopher to achieve changelessness, he would 
have to transcend his human nature and become, as it were, divine.  Earlier in the Symposium, 
Plato argues that eros is conditional upon lack; those secure in their possession of the good would 
cease to experience eros (200a).  In this regard, he argues that the gods are beings beyond eros 
 
38 Thus, even if we assume that all souls are eternal in the sense that they persist in time, only those souls 
that grasp the forms have the potential to achieve changeless eternality.  Souls that are composed of mere 
beliefs fail to achieve any sort of cognitive stability, since their beliefs are liable to be contradicted and 
abandoned; as a result, even if the soul persists in time, it does not remain the same. 
39 O’Brien (1984: 197-8, n. 34) argues that in this context εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ does not have a concessive 
sense, so much as an emphatic sense: the philosopher, more than anyone, will become immortal.  
However, as O’Brien himself observes, Plato’s earlier concessive phrasings, such as 207d1, support 
taking εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ as having a concessive sense in this context. 
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(202c-d; cf. 204a); by contrast at 205a, he claims that all humans are subject to eros for possessing 
the good.  Thus, were the philosopher to succeed in achieving eternal possession of the good, he 
would cease to be human and assume quasi-divine status.  But while Plato frequently portrays 
assimilation to god (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) as the human telos, he invariably adds the qualification ‘to the 
extent possible’ (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν), suggesting that wholesale divinization is simply not possible 
for humans.40   
 What are Plato’s grounds for doubt?  On the one hand, his interrelated portrayal of Eros 
and Socrates suggests significant skepticism regarding our prospects of coming to know the forms.  
Plato writes that Eros is neither mortal nor immortal, but is constantly being born, dying and being 
reborn; that is, he is subject to flux and incapable of unchanging eternality.  He adds that Eros is 
between knowledge and ignorance: while the gods possess all that is good and are hence wise, 
Eros is incapable of wisdom (204a-b).  As such, Eros is doomed to be a philosophos—one who 
loves wisdom but, as a precondition of his love, can never achieve it.  These facets of Eros are 
non-accidentally related: it is because Eros is incapable of wisdom that he is incapable of true 
immortality and is subject to flux.  But to the extent that Eros is a philosophos, this suggests that 
the philosopher, too, is one who cannot hope to achieve full wisdom or immortality.  As many 
commentators have noticed, Plato is at pains in his portrayal of Socrates – poor, unshod, stopping 
on people’s doorsteps, self-avowedly amorous and ignorant – to suggest that he is to be identified 
with the spirit, Eros.41  Perhaps we are meant to conclude that even Socrates is incapable of 
completing the ascent, of grasping the form and achieving permanent possession of the good.  In 
fact, I believe that Plato is deliberately ambiguous concerning Socrates’ epistemic state: passages 
such as 177d suggest, by contrast, that he has completed the erōtika and gained knowledge of the 
 
40 See, e.g. Republic 613b, Theaetetus 176b, Timaeus 90c. 
41 E.g. Benardete 1993: 67, Bury 1932: xlvii, lx-lxii, Nehamas 1999: 312. 
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form.42  But this, in turn, gives rise to a distinct, and perhaps more troubling reason for doubt.  
Even if Socrates has completed the ascent, far from transcending eros, he appears to continue to 
thirst after knowledge.  He is famously depicted as cycling in and out of contemplative trances 
(175b, 220c); the implication is that, even if Socrates can grasp the form, his grasp is only partial 
and sporadic.  Far from achieving stable possession of the good, his knowledge is constantly 
escaping him and requiring replenishment. 
 Thus, even if Plato believes that knowledge of the form is something that a human can 
hope to achieve, he suggests that such knowledge may not, in fact, possess the stability that would 
be required for it to render the philosopher’s soul unchangingly immortal.43  In fact, Plato raises 
precisely these doubts about the stability of knowledge in the flux passage.  After describing how 
mortal nature is subject to flux in both body and soul, in an apparently unmotivated aside, he adds 
that the same account applies to knowledge.  Just as our psychic states come into existence and 
cease to exist, so, too, some knowledge comes into existence in our souls while other knowledge 
is destroyed.  But the instability of knowledge runs deeper than that.  For even if we consider a 
given piece of knowledge that appears to be constant and unchanging, in fact, Plato reveals, it only 
maintains this appearance through a process of going over (μελετᾶν), in which old memories are 
replaced with new ones; the knowledge is preserved ‘in such a manner that it seems to be the same’ 
(208a).  It emerges that knowledge has no more stability than our hair or toenails: it appears to be 
the same, but is rather an interconnected series of memories.  This is, in fact, a deeply startling 
claim for Plato to make, given that in other dialogues, its stability is the defining feature of 
 
42 For an argument that Socrates has not completed the ascent, see Sheffield 2006: 196, n. 27. 
43 As I go on to argue, in dialogues both preceding and following the Symposium, stability is a defining 
feature of knowledge.  Thus, we might have reason to wonder whether the form of knowledge under 
discussion in Diotima’s speech—liable to being forgotten and requiring constant replenishment—even 
deserves to be called knowledge. 
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knowledge.  In the Meno, Plato famously distinguishes knowledge from true belief because 
knowledge is such as to remain fixed whereas true belief is liable to wander (97e-8a).  This imagery 
is picked up in the Protagoras, when Plato contrasts the power of appearance, which causes the 
soul to wander (ἐπλάνα), with the measuring art, which gives it stillness (ἡσυχία, 356d-e).  
Likewise, in the Affinity Argument of the Phaedo, Plato calls wisdom the state of the soul when 
it is always the same and stable because it is in touch with forms (79d).  And in the Timaeus, Plato 
contrasts intelligence with true belief, since it is unmoved (ἀκίνητον) by persuasion (51e).44  Given 
that Plato repeatedly defines knowledge in terms of its stability, his claim in the Symposium that 
knowledge is subject to flux is striking.  
What are Plato’s reasons for doubting that the philosopher can achieve stable knowledge 
and with it, changeless eternality and happiness?  In general terms, these doubts stem from a 
growing awareness of the extreme ontological chasm that separates the philosopher’s merely 
human soul from the forms that it contemplates.  In the Affinity Argument of the Phaedo we saw 
Plato divide reality into two kinds and place the philosopher’s body on the side of the perceptible 
and the mortal, his soul on the side of the imperceptible and eternal forms.  It is the kinship of the 
soul to the forms that undergirds its immortality in the Phaedo.  By contrast, in the Symposium, 
Plato is at pains to emphasize the chasm separating mortal soul and immortal forms.  The form is 
presented as radically separated from the spatiotemporal realm; it does not appear in the guise of 
anything belonging to body or soul (211a), but exists apart from ‘mortal nonsense,’ impassive and 
 
44 It is worth noting that different, though interrelated, forms of stability appear to be at work in these 
passages.  Thus, in the Meno and Timaeus, knowledge is stable in the sense that it is not liable to be 
abandoned; the Phaedo draws focus to the way in which knowledge is a stable condition of the soul, i.e. 
one in which the soul is relatively immune to change.  This parallels the two forms of instability that Plato 
attributes to knowledge in the flux passage: on the one hand, much knowledge simply departs from the 
soul (207e5-8a2); on the other hand, even knowledge that appears to be constant fails to constitute a 
single, unchanging psychic state, but rather amounts to a series of memories (208a1-7). 
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unaffected.  As we have seen, this ontological divide gives us reason to question – perhaps along 
the lines that Plato develops in the Parmenides (133b-4e) – whether the human soul, situated as it 
is in space and time, is really the sort of thing that could grasp forms.  In what way could a soul 
like ours grasp an object that is so radically different in kind from itself?  Furthermore, as the flux 
passage and the portrayal of Socrates suggest, even if we could grasp the forms, it is not clear that 
we could sustain this grasp; our knowledge would always be flowing out of us, subject to 
replenishment and at risk of being forgotten altogether.45  But a final, and most significant, ground 
for doubt arises from consideration of the nature of knowledge itself.  If knowledge consisted in a 
direct and unmediated grasp of the form, then perhaps we might have reason to hope that this 
would cause knower to assimilate to known, the immortality of the form to rub off onto the soul 
of the philosopher.  But at 211a, Plato draws a significant distinction.  He writes, ‘Nor will the 
beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body, or 
any argument (λόγος) or knowledge.’  Part of the philosopher’s knowledge of the form appears to 
be a recognition that the form is fundamentally different from his cognitive representation of it; 
his knowledge of the form is a mere representation of the form and as such belongs to the world 
of becoming, separated from its object by the ontological chasm that he has now come to recognize.  
Paradoxically, the very separation of the form that ensures its unchangingly eternality, and thereby 
offers the philosopher the hope of earned immortality, precludes the philosopher’s soul from fully 
assimilating to it (211b).  But in that case, even if the philosopher could come to know the form, 
he would have no reason to think that its unchanging nature could rub off onto what is, in the end, 
merely a human mind. 
8  Later Developments 
 
45 See also Nightingale 2017: 144-5. 
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What we have uncovered so far is that there is a significant shift in Plato’s position on earned 
immortality between the Phaedo and the Symposium.46  In the Phaedo, Plato is confident that the 
soul is akin to the forms, and that contemplation of forms can cause the soul to assimilate to their 
unchanging eternality.  By contrast, in the Symposium, Plato treats the soul as subject to flux and 
places it on the side of becoming; his awareness of the ontological chasm between the soul and the 
forms leads him to doubt that the philosopher’s grasp of the form could cause his soul fully to 
assimilate to its changeless eternality.  This realization leaves Plato with three philosophical 
alternatives.  He can embrace the skepticism about earned immortality that he develops in the 
Symposium.  He can attempt to bring the forms back to earth, as it were, reducing the separation 
between the forms and human souls so that we might hope fully to assimilate to them.  And finally, 
he could downgrade the requirements for earned immortality.  Following the Symposium, it is the 
last of these alternatives that Plato adopts.47    
 Thus, in dialogues such as the Phaedrus and Timaeus, Plato remains emphatic about the 
separation of forms.  In the Phaedrus, the forms are described as existing in a place beyond the 
universe; our souls can only see them at a distance, from the periphery of the universe, but can 
never exit the universe and enter the realm of forms (247b-c).48  Just as the Phaedrus places the 
 
46 In this chapter, I assume a developmentalist reading of Plato and attribute the shift between Plato’s 
treatment of earned immortality in the Phaedo and Symposium to a growing skepticism about our 
prospects of fully assimilating to the forms. Those who subscribe to a unitarian reading might instead 
explain the divergence between the two dialogues in terms of their differing dramatic contexts. The 
Phaedo seeks to explain Socrates’ confidence in the face of his imminent death and to provide a 
protreptic to philosophy; these features perhaps explain its confidence in the power of philosophy to 
confer an enhanced form of immortality onto the soul of the philosopher. 
 
47 For an excellent discussion of the progression of Plato’s thought about immortality, see Bett 1999.  Bett 
notes that the Phaedo treats the soul as immortal in virtue of being changeless, whereas later dialogues 
connect its immortality to its constant motion; however, Bett does not connect this progression to Plato’s 
treatment of earned immortality. 
48 But see 248a for a possible softening of this degree of separation. 
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forms outside of space, so the Timaeus sets them outside of time.  The forms possess ungenerated 
being; as such, they exist forever outside of time and are immune to change, ‘always immovably 
in the same state’ (38a).   By contrast, as generated beings, the universe, including cosmic gods 
and mortal souls that reside within it, are incapable of eternal existence (37d).  But at the same 
time as Plato specifies that our souls are incapable of assimilating to the changeless eternality of 
the forms, he offers us a downgraded version.  The demiurge creates time as a ‘moving image of 
eternity’ (37d) – note the contrast with the immovable existence of forms – and confers immortality 
within time upon the rational parts of our souls.   
Though this form of immortality inevitably involves motion, there is still a sense in which 
our souls can come to approximate – though not fully assimilate to – the changeless condition of 
the forms.  We see this in how Plato characterizes divine soul.  Though he presents the gods as in 
motion, he emphasizes that the form of motion that they partake of is maximally stable; 
furthermore, he identifies this form of stable motion with intelligence and wisdom.  Thus, at 34a, 
Plato writes that the demiurge gave the universe the form of motion most associated with 
intelligence and wisdom, uniform rotation in the same place.  Similarly, at 40a-b, the cosmic gods 
are given rotational and revolutionary motion; ‘with respect to the other five motions, [he made 
them] motionless and still, in order that each of them might be as good as possible’—the gods’ 
relative changelessness is identified with their goodness and perfection.  The gods engage in 
rotational motion because this state of their souls is wisdom: they move uniformly in the same 
place so that ‘they always think the same things concerning the same things’ (40a-b).  Plato further 
develops this idea in the Laws, when he argues that the universe is engaged in rotational motion 
because rotation is the form of motion most appropriate for reason, since it moves ‘regularly and 
uniformly in the same place and around the same things and in relation to the same things and 
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according to one principle and order’ (898a-b).   Though Plato does not fully spell out his 
reasoning, he appears to think that wisdom and intelligence have a stability that perhaps derives 
from the unchanging nature of their objects.  Significantly, though, wisdom no longer involves the 
soul’s fully assimilating to the unchanging eternality of its objects, but rather its engaging in a 
maximally stable form of motion.  Thus, in the imagery of the Phaedrus, it is significant that when 
divine and mortal souls commune with the forms, they do so in a condition of both stability and 
motion: they station themselves on the periphery of the universe, and then, carried around by its 
rotational motion, gaze upon the forms (247b-c).49   
But if divine soul is characterized, not by changelessness, but by stable motion, then to the 
extent that the philosopher seeks to assimilate to the divine, it is this condition that he seeks to 
approximate.   And this is exactly how Plato characterizes earned immortality in the Timaeus.  
Though all souls partake of immortality to the extent that they possess reason, an immortal 
element, most souls are subject to chaotic motion, due to the impact of perceptible objects and the 
interference of the sub-rational parts of the soul (43a-e).  But when the philosopher observes the 
perfect motions of world-soul, his soul assimilates to them and assumes a stable form of motion 
(47a-c).  At the conclusion of the dialogue, in a passage I quoted earlier, Plato writes of how the 
man who devotes himself to philosophy, through thinking divine thoughts and grasping the truth, 
partakes of immortality to the extent possible (90a-d).  His partaking of immortality is specifically 
characterized in terms of his studying the revolutions of the universe and as a result, adopting its 
motions.  To the extent that human soul observes and thinks about the motions of the universe, it 
engages in those same motions; as a result, it comes to resemble divine soul.  But to the extent that 
 
49 The Statesman is also surely relevant to this discussion: in the myth, the universe adopts a renewed 
immortality when the god takes over its motion and sets it straight (273e). 
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divine soul engages in stable motion, it also approximates the changeless eternality of the forms.50  
What Plato is offering here is no longer the hope that the philosopher’s soul can fully assimilate to 
the changelessness of the forms; rather, he is outlining how as generated beings, our intellects can 
come to closely resemble divine soul and thereby approximate, to a lesser extent, the forms.51 
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